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COMMENT
REFORMING HUD'S "ONE-STRJKE" PUBLIC
HOUSING EVICTIONS THROUGH TENANT
PARTICIPATION
ADAM P. HELEGERS
I. INTRODUCTION: THE CONFLUENCE OF POPULAR AND LEGAL
CONTROVERSY
With a garden overflowing with nasturtiums and three grandchildren in
her care, Ann Greene seems like the last person anyone at the Alemany
housing complex would call a criminal.
"It's not fair," said the 63-year-old Greene, holding the eviction notice
she received on Friday. "I don't have any place to go. I haven't done
anything wrong.
Vanessa Ballentine hoped to make a difference at Wilkes Villa by con-
verting an abandoned apartment building into a learning center for
children.
Now, because of [the criminal activity of] her own children, Ballentine is
being evicted from her apartment and has been ordered to stay away
2
from the center.
I Catherine Bowman, Son's Troubles May Cost Woman Her Apartment. She Fights 'One-
Strike' Policy at S.F. HousingProjects, S.F. CHRON.,July 16, 1996, at All.
2 Molly Kavanaugh, Tenant Who Spearheaded Kids' CenterFaces Eviction, PLAIN DEALER,
Sept. 24, 1996, at 3B.
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Any federal policy that results in the eviction of nasturtium-
toting grandmothers and well-meaning community activists
from public housing is bound to elicit criticism from both inves-
tigative reporters and public housing residents alike.3
In 1996, President Clinton announced during his State of
the Union Address that "[c]riminal gang members and drug
dealers are destroying the lives of decent tenants. From now on,
the rule for residents who commit crime and pedal [sic] drugs
should be one strike and you're out. ' 4 How did the reach of the
President's national policy declaration expand to envelop the
very "decent tenants" the President intended to protect?
5
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment's controversial "one-strike" regulation, C.F.R. § 966.4, em-
powers local public housing authorities ("PHAs") to terminate a
resident's tenancy for "any criminal activity that threatens the
health, safety, or quiet enjoyment of the PHAs... premises...
or (B) any drug-related criminal activity on or near the prem-
ises."6 Section 966.4 extends far beyond evicting individuals for
their own criminal actions; it creates a cause for termination of
tenancy where a "tenant, any member of the household, a guest,
or another person under the tenant's control," engages in
criminal activity.
7
Popular critique of this provision has not focused on the no-
tion of eviction for criminal activity. In a 1995 national poll,
88% of the adult African-Americans surveyed agreed that peo-
3 See, e.g., Catherine Bowman, 'One Strike' Lease Angers S.F. Public Housing Tenants,
S.F. CHRON., Oct. 4, 1996, at A21 ("'This is the worst lease the Housing Authority ever
put out,' said tenant Rosemary Ozan. 'You're putting people out, not giving them a
chance."').
President William J. Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 23, 1996) (1996
WL 23253, at *8).
See Scott Gold & Sarah Lundy, Family Says Housing Authority Law Is Unfair; "One
Strike"Policy Puts Some on the Street, SUN-SENTmNEL (FORT LAUDERDALE), Palm Beach Edi-
tion, Oct. 17, 1996, at 1B ("'Mr. Clinton had to mean it for someone who does some-
thing wrong.., this is not that situation. Mr. Clinton certainly didn't mean this."').
6 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (f) (12) (i) (1997). PHAs exercise this authority by using tenant
leases that identify such conduct as grounds for termination of tenancy. See Rucker v.
Davis, No. C98-00781 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *3-*4 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
1998), for an example of a closely conforming lease clause. See also infra Section II
of this Comment for a normative description of the "one-strike" policy.
7 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1) (2) (ii) (1997) (emphasis added).
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ple living in public housing should be evicted if they are con-
victed of possession or sales of illegal drugs.8 Accordingly, me-
dia accounts are peppered with expressions of tenant support
for "a federally mandated policy that calls for automatic eviction
of tenants who commit crimes."9 In this sense, the one-strike
policy appears to enjoy a broad base of support. 0
Considerable criticism is brought when tenants are evicted
for "the crimes of others," or for third party criminal activity."
Section 966.4 is constructed in such a way that leads to one of
three possible circumstances for third party eviction. First, the
criminal activity of someone under a tenant's "control" may lead
to a tenant's eviction. 2 The statutory structure suggests that a
person need not be a household member or guest to be under a
tenant's control. 13  For example, the San Francisco Housing
Authority served a notice of eviction on Ann Greene "because
her 38-year-old son, Ladell Greene, was accused of possessing
drugs four blocks away from the apartment complex," 14 even
though he did not live with her, and was not visiting.15 Similarly,
in Chavez v. Housing Authority of El Paso,'6 Elfida Chavez was
evicted after her son allegedly threatened two housing project
'Omnifacts, Inc., Public Opinion Online, Roper Center at the University of Con-
necticut, July 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, NEWS GROUP FILE, BY INDIVIDUAL
PUBLICATION.
' See, e.g., Cindy Schroeder, Eviction Policy Arguable; Residents Generally Applaud It,
CINCINNATi ENQUIRER, Sept.r 28, 1996, at B1.
,' See Darlene McCormick, Public Housing Rule Aired, TAMPA TRIB., May 4, 1996,
South Tampa 1 ("Public housing residents poured into a monthly board meeting at
the Tampa Housing Authority Friday to let leaders know they don't want drug dealers
and criminals in their neighborhoods. But they don't want government stepping on
the innocent in an effort to clean up the neighborhoods, either.").
" See id. However, there is significant popular support for this policy as well. See
Out The Door, 'One-strike'Eviction Targets MHA Crime, CoMM. APPEAL, Sept. 2, 1996, at
10A ("'I'm in total agreement,' said Rev. James Robinson, president of the MHA
[Memphis Housing Authority] Citywide Residents Council. 'I think it will call for
lease-holders to start exercising a little more authority over their children and their
households.'").
12 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1) (2) (ii) (1997).
32 Id.
14 Bowman, supra note 1.
1. Id.
6 973 F.2d 1245, 1247 (5th Cir. 1992).
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security guards. 7 Ms. Chavez's son was neither a household
member nor a guest at the time he allegedly committed this
criminal act, but public housing officials deemed him to be un-
der his mother's control. 8 While familial relations between
tenants and criminal actors can be sufficient to establish the re-
quired "control" that may trigger eviction, 9 some courts may
require that the relationship consist of more than blood ties.2"
PHAs have also employed the one-strike policy to evict en-
tire households for the criminal activity of one wayward house-
hold member, on the reasoning that section 966.4 triggers a
termination of the entire tenancy, and does not just evict indi-
viduals for their own criminal behavior.2 For instance, in Char-
lotte Housing Authority v. Patterson,22 the Authority moved to evict
Roxieanne Patterson and her two daughters for the alleged
criminal behavior of a third child listed on the lease, her son
Jonathan Givens. 5
Lastly, a notice of eviction may be served on a tenant for a
guest's criminal activity.
24 In Chicago Housing Authority v. Rose,
25
the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") filed a complaint
against Jacqueline Rose, seeking possession of her Cabrini-
Green public housing apartment, after police found two shot-
17 Id. at 1248.
'8 See id. at 1247. For a comprehensive treatment of Chavez, see Nelson H. Mock,
Punishing The Innocent: No-Fault Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third
Parties, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1495, 1508, 1522-23 (1998).
19 See; e.g., Turner v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1299, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(plaintiff tenants evicted because of criminal conduct committed by their allegedly
nonresident and nonguest children).
' See Chavez, 973 F.2d at 1248 (asserting that mother's eviction for son's criminal
activity would have been impermissible were it based merely on their parent-child re-
lationship); see also Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 516-20
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding that evicting a tenant "solely and exclusively because of the
misdeeds of his adult child, who does not reside in the parental home," raises a valid
claim for violation of a tenant's due process rights, namely the fundamental right of
freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment).
2 See, e.g., Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995).
2Id. at 70. His name was removed from the lease in 1988, but added back in 1991.
Id. Givens was arrested two times from 1990-1992, including for murder. Id. An evic-
tion notice was served on May 12, 1992. Id. at 69.
2-4 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1) (2) (ii) (1997).
25 560 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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guns in her unit. 6 Her visiting half-brother admitted to stashing
them there without Ms. Rose's knowledge or consent.
27
Both academic commentators and evictee litigants have
seized upon the fact that HUD and local public housing officials
assert that tenants who "did not know [of], could not foresee, or
could not control [criminal] behavior,"2 are still vulnerable to
one-strike evictions.2 Previous scholarly contributions have
used the terms "no-fault" or "strict liability" interchangeably to
describe this eviction standard;"0 in keeping with the latest juris-
prudential trends, however, this Comment will describe this
practice as the eviction of an "innocent" tenant.
This Comment lays siege to the legal rationale supporting
innocent evictions. Cut off from popular support, HUD's posi-
26 Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133. Rose's eviction was invalidated after ajury finding that she neither
knew nor should have known that her brother placed guns in her apartment. Id. at
1132-34. The appellate court affirmed the propriety of the jury instructions requiring
this finding. Id. at 1138. The court interpreted the plain language of the word "per-
mit" in Rose's CHA lease to mean that a tenant must authorize or consent to a guest's
criminal activity for an eviction to be valid. Id. at 1136-37. For discussion on the Sub-
stantive Due Process Clause, see infra, note 79 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of civil liberties challenges to innocent evictions, see infra note 95 and
accompanying text.
" Public Hous. Lease & Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 (1991)
(to be codified at 24 C.F.Rt pt. 966).
For an example of a litigated challenge to this contention, see Turner v. Chicago
Hous. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1299, 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (plaintiff contesting that CHA
leaseholder "is responsible for his or her guests and visitors as long as they are on
CHA property, even if the guest leaves the CHA property and later comes back to the
property without the tenant's knowledge"). For an example of a general academic
critique of the one-strike policy, see generallyJason Dzubow, Fear-Free Public Housing?:
An Evaluation of HUD's "One Strike And You're Out" Housing Policy, 6 TEMP. POi- & CIv.
RTS. L. REV. 55, 56 (1997).
"' See, e.g., Mock, supra note 18, at 1497 n.10 ("This Note uses the terms no-fault
evictions and strict liability evictions interchangeably to describe evictions that hold a
tenant strictly liable for the actions of third parties.").
" See Rucker v. Davis, No. C98-00781 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *4-*5
(N.C. Cal.June 19, 1998):
As defendants note ... [the term strictly liable] is a misnomer because the tenant is
not being held liable, rather, the tenant forfeits her interest in the leasehold .... The
Court will refer to the termination of tenancies under such circumstances as the termina-
tion of the lease of an "innocent" tenant as it is conceded that the tenant is innocent of the
drug-related criminal activity which is the cause of the lease termination and it is alleged
that the tenant is also innocent of any knowledge of the drug-related criminal activity.
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don that a tenant targeted for eviction need not have knowl-
edge of or consent to a third party's criminal activity has been
weakened before an arsenal of challenges in the form of consti-
tutional objections,32 hostile lease interpretations, 33 and statutory
silence on the matter.34 This Comment forwards two arguments.
First, an analysis of section 1437d(1) (5) of the Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, which
authorizes C.F.R. § 966.4, reveals that Congress was silent on
whether tenants need to have knowledge of or consent to the
third party criminal activity for which they are evicted.s' This si-
lence prevents courts from applying any statutorily created legal
standard to evaluate HUD's regulatory interpretation of section
1437d(1) (5), beyond asking merely whether such lease termina-
tion conditions are "reasonable." 6 Second, Congress has the
opportunity to fill this statutory gap by providing a mechanism
for public housing tenants to determine the scope of the one-
strike rule themselves, rather than abdicating that decision to
the uncertain discretion of the judiciary,
32 SeeTyson v. NewYork City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 518-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(challenge to an eviction of tenants based on crimes committed by children no
longer living with tenants states a claim for violation of tenants' substantive due proc-
ess rights, and an eviction based on a relationship to a person who commits a crime
violates the First Amendment right to freedom of association). For a discussion on
other constitutional challenges to one-strike evictions, See Section III, infra notes 77-
111 and accompanying text.
" See Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Rose, 560 N.E.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(construing the lease term "permit" to mean that, for an eviction to be valid, the de-
fendant must have consented to, or authorized the presence of, explosives or weap-
ons in their unit).
3' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (Supp. III 1997):
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which-. .. (5) provide that any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the
premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, en-
gaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest
or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy.
Id. See also Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *18 (noting that 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(1)(5) is silent on whether tenant knowledge of or consent to third party
criminal activity is required).
" See§ 1437d(1) (5).
16 Id. § 1437d(l) ("Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which-(1) do
not contain unreasonable terms and conditions."). See Richmond Tenants Organization
v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 751 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1990),
for an example of a case applying this reasonableness standard.
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The following section provides a backdrop and summary of
crime in public housing and HUD anti-crime strategies, and
then lays out the law and official policy surrounding the one-
strike rule as it currently stands. Part III describes the constitu-
tional challenges that have been aimed at innocent evictions
and other aspects of the one-strike rule. Part IV outlines various
past and recent judicial reactions to innocent eviction lease
terms, the instrument through which the one-strike rule's stric-
tures are imposed. This discussion demonstrates the diversity of
approaches that currently exist when federal regulation meets
PHA discretion in lease clause drafting. Part V focuses on two
recent interpretations of section 1437d(1) (5), and concludes
that the statute's silence on the issue of tenant knowledge or
consent, coupled with an ambiguous accompanying legislative
history, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to decide
the knowledge question. Part V resolves that in the absence of a
clear Congressional mandate, courts must rely on the more
broad pronouncement of section 1437d(l), that "[e]ach public
housing agency shall utilize leases which-(1) do not contain
unreasonable terms and conditions, 37 to decide whether failing
to require tenant knowledge in eviction lease clauses amounts
to an "unreasonable" lease term. This section concludes that
the inherent uncertainty of a "reasonableness" standard allows
courts to exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether
to enforce innocent evictions.
Part VI suggests an alternative to leaving this issue up to the
whim of a court's interpretive discretion. It proposes that sec-
tion 1437d(1) (5) be amended to empower local public housing
residents at each PHA to create a general rule determining the
role of fault and knowledge of criminal activity in tenant evic-
tions. This proposal finds support in (1) the language encour-
aging tenant consultation and citizen participation that can be
found throughout HUD affordable housing legislation and pol-
icy, 8 (2) the advancement of tenant consultation as a method
17 § 1437d(1) (emphasis added).
S ee, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-316, § 107, at 198-99 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.CAN. 5793, 596D-61 (requiring citizen participation in the development of
1999] 329
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for empowering inner city and public housing residents in
much more ambitious arenas, 9 and (3) popular accounts dem-
onstrating that public housing residents are capable of achiev-
ing localized consensus on this discrete issue.
In recent years, the scholarly and legal attention paid to in-
nocent evictions has kept pace with increasing public housing
tenant concern.4 1 This Comment concludes that public housing
localized public housing strategies). See also infra notes 198-99 and accompanying
text.
" See generally Marvin Krislov, Ensuring Tenant Consultation Before Public Housing Is
Demolished or Sol, 97 YALE L.J. 1745 (1988); Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Re-
defined: Revitalizing The Central City With Resident Control, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 689
(1994).
" Compare Bowman, supra note 3 (most tenants at San Francisco PHA oppose third
party criminal activity evictions) with Out the Door, supra note 11 (most MHA tenant
leaders support innocent evictions).
For a citation to just about every state and federal decision involving innocent
evictions in recent years, see Mock, supra note 18, at n.52 (litigative history demon-
strates a general trend towards increased challenges to innocent evictions). The fol-
lowing is an expanded and updated version of Mock's history: Chavez v. Housing
Auth. of El Paso, 973 F.2d 1245, 1248 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that mother's eviction
for son's criminal activity was not impermissibly based on their parent-child relation-
ship but because he was under his mother's control); Henry v. Wild Pines Apart-
ments, 359 S.E.2d 237, 238-39 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (ruling that a tenant could not be
evicted without knowledge of or consent to a fight at her apartment by two acquain-
tances that took place while she was away); Housing Auth. v. Brown, 349 S.E.2d 501,
503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a tenant should not be evicted when he did not
know of or consent to the use of his apartment by others for criminal activity); Wil-
liams v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285, 291-92 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that
a tenant's awareness of the violent acts of her children was necessary for eviction, but
also that such awareness of and ability to prevent violent behavior of a household
member should be inferred where there is a history of violent acts); American
Apartment Management Co. v. Phillips, 653 N.E.2d 834, 840-41 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995)
(interpreting a lease clause making a tenant responsible for the acts of guests or
household members as requiring knowledge of the drug activity of her guest); Diver-
sified Realty Group, Inc. v. Davis, 628 N.E.2d 1081, 1084-85 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (in-
terpreting a section eight contract that held residents liable for the actions of their
guests as including a knowledge-or-fault requirement); Mid-Northern Management v.
Heinzeroth, 599 N.E.2d 568, 572-73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that when a tenant
did not have knowledge and did not consent to the behavior of her son and had pun-
ished him for prior behavior, she could not be evicted); Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Rose,
560 N.E.2d 1131, 1136-37 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990) (interpreting a lease to require knowl-
edge of or consent to the behavior of a third party, but holding that the presence in
the apartment of the guns of the tenant's brother created a rebuttable presumption
that the tenant knew of the guns); Housing Auth. of New Orleans v. Green, 657 So.2d
552, 554-55 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that an eviction following the discovery of
drugs hidden by a guest without the knowledge or consent of the tenant was proper,
since the lease term "control" "means that the tenant 'controls' who has access to the
1999] REFORMING HUD
premises."); Gibson v. Housing Auth., 579 So. 2d 528, 530-31 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that only household members who had engaged in illegal activity can be
evicted); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Bell, 697 N.E.2d 130, 132 (Mass. 1998) (holding that
if tenant demonstrates that she could not have foreseen and prevented household
member's violence, good cause for eviction does not exist); DePopolo v. Brookline
Rent Control Bd., No. 9209 CV 0204, 1993 WL 340693, at *3 (Mass. App. Div. Sept. 2,
1993) (holding that, when there was a history of dangerous behavior by a tenant's
son, the tenant did not overcome the inference that she could have foreseen or pre-
vented the problem); Hodess v. Bonefont, 519 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Mass. 1988) (hold-
ing that the mere evidence of the relationship between a tenant and her sons was not
enough to warrant a finding that the tenant could reasonably have foreseen and pre-
vented a theft in another apartment by her two sons); Spence v. O'Brien, 446 N.E.2d
1070, 1073-74 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that when tenant knew of a guest's
drug activities but did little to prevent those activities, the Boston Housing Authority
had sufficient basis to evict her); Spence v. Gormley, 439 N.E.2d 741, 746 (Mass.
1982) (holding that when a tenant can show that she could not have foreseen or pre-
vented a household member's violation, there is not cause to evict); Minneapolis Pub-
lic Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 578 N.W.2d 8, 10-11 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that
district court's dismissal of housing authority's unlawful detainer action was proper,
in part because HUD regulations allow evicting power to consider the extent of par-
ticipation by family members and exercise discretion to decide if eviction is inappro-
priate), rev'd, 591 N.W.2d 700 (Minn. 1999); Syracuse Hous. Auth. v. Boule, 676
N.Y.S.2d 741, 742 (N.Y. County Ct. 1998), rev'd, No. 1164, 99-183, 1999 WL 784142
(N.Y. App. Div., Oct. 1 1999) (holding that for good cause to evict, a public housing
tenant must be personally at fault for a guest's drug activity); Adams v. Franco, 638
N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (ruling that a PHA's refusal to grant a remain-
ing family member a lease after his mother committed a crime was "so shocking to
basic notions of fairness as to constitute an abuse of discretion"); Cabrera v. New York
City Hous. Auth., 590 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (ruling that when a ten-
ant's children were no longer living with her, she could not be evicted despite their
drug offenses in the public housing complex); Corchado v. Popolizio, 567 N.Y.S.2d
460, 461-62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that "forfeiture of a significant property
interest involves substantial due process concerns," and noting that it would be
"shocking to one's sense of fairness to exclude non-offending tenants from public
housing when an offending family member has been excluded from the household at
the time of the hearing"); Hines v. New York City Hous. Auth., 413 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735
(N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (stating that "[i] t would be shocking to one's sense of fairness
to terminate the tenancy of persons who have not committed nondesirable acts and
who have not controlled those who have committed such acts"); Charlotte Hous.
Auth. v. Fleming, 473 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that since the
tenant was not aware of her non-resident son's presence in front of her apartment, he
was not a guest, and the tenant was therefore not responsible for the son's alleged
criminal activity and could not be evicted); Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464
S.E.2d 68, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that legislative history dictated that good
cause for eviction does not exist under 42 U.S.C § 1437(d) (1) (5) if a public housing
tenant is not personally at fault for the criminal activities of a member of the tenant's
household); Allegheny County Hous. Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1998) (district court's decision that one household member should not
be evicted for another's criminal activity was an improper judicial substitution of
authority judgment and discretion); Barajas v. Housing Auth. of Harlingen, 882
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residents themselves have the most vested interest in creating
policies that promote safe, functional public housing communi-
ties, and are best positioned to determine how far the rule must
go in their own neighborhood to realize that objective. It would
only be fitting for the controversy to be resolved by those who
most clearly desire its resolution.2
II. WHERE AND How THE ONE-STRIKE RULE STANDS
A. CRIME AND ANTI-CRIME STRATEGIES IN PUBLIC HOUSING
AUTHORITIES
In the United States, crime statistics are recorded as broadly
as statewide, and are broken down as narrowly as individual po-
lice precincts.43 Unfortunately, however, no comprehensive set
of statistics measures crime rates in federally supported public
housing, either individually or in the aggregate." The clear
consensus among policymakers and law enforcement officials,
however, is that crime levels are at their highest magnification
S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App. 1994) (holding that the eviction of both household
members following one's drug-related criminal activity was proper, since lease lan-
guage unambiguously terminates tenancy for tenant criminal activity); Moundsville
Hous. Auth. v. Porter, 370 S.E.2d 341, 343 (W. Va. 1988) (per curiam) (ruling that a
beating of a tenant by her live-in companion did not rise to the level of seriousness
necessary for her eviction, even though she did not exclude him from her apart-
ment).
" See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., SAFE COMMUNITIES WEIGH HEAVILY IN
SHOPPING (SIC) ArTrrUDEs TOwARD PUBLIC HOUSING (Federal Document Clearing
House, May 21, 1997) available in LEXIS, NEWS GROUP FILE, ALL (hereinafter Safe
Communities). "In 16 focus group meetings with current [public housing] residents
and individuals on the waiting list, respondents said that they are more concerned
with how safe, secure and drug-free an environment is rather than what color their
neighbors are." Id.
43 See generally, e.g., FEDERAL BuREAu OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES
1996: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1997). This comprehensive statistical evaluation re-
ports crime on the national, regional, state, and county level.
"' See The White House, VP Announces $21 Z3m in Grants to Fight Crime and Drugs in
Public and Assisted Housing, M2 PRESSWIRE, Nov. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Da-
tabase, Wire Service Stories. ("No separate statistics exist for crime in public and as-
sisted housing."). Some individual PHAs, however, do measure crime rates in
individual projects. See, e.g., Martha Carr, Crime Down in St. John Public Housing; Rules
Tightened; Police Reinforced, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 29, 1999, at B1. ("Arrests in the
complexes dropped more than 22 percent last year, from 244 in 1997 to 190 in 1998,
a report released by the Housing Authority shows.").
[Vol. 90
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within concentrated public housing communities. 5  Because
"[c]rime persists as our Nation's dominant fear[, if we listen to
opinion polls,"46 the popular view of crime in public housing is
that it is the worst of our worst-that PHAs are suffering from
the most intense concentration of our country's greatest social
dilemma.
HUD's responsibility to fund and oversee local PHAs na-
tionwide 8 makes it both an effective and rare conduit through
which the federal government can approach the problems of
crime. Although the federal government's political incentive to
battle crime is great, its opportunities are limited, as law en-
forcement powers are exercised primarily on the state and local
level.49 But, PHAs depend on HUD approval to receive much
" See The White House, supra note 44. ("[Public housing developments] have his-
torically suffered some of the highest crime rates."). See also Safety and Security in Pub-
lic Housing. Field Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. and Community Dev. of the Comm.
on Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs-House of Representatives, 103d Cong. 96 (1994)
(statement of Representative Gutierrez) ("It is a crisis that, I believe, has become the
greatest challenge facing our nation-how do we protect our homes, our streets, our
families from crime and violence?"). See also id. at 9 (statement of Senator Moseley-
Braun) ("[I]n many federally financed public housing projects, the level of violence
has reached epidemic proportions, threatening on a daily basis the lives of the major-
ity of the tenants who are law abiding.").
46 HENRY G. CISNEROS, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: DETERRING CRIME AND BUILDING COM-
MuNrrY3 (1995).
a See Rob Teir, Tenants' Privacy Held Captive by Crime, NAT'L LJ., May 9, 1994, at
A21. There is also the notion that some cities' public housing developments are the
worst of that worst. See The White House, Vice Pres. Announces New Four-Part Strategy to
Fight Crime and Drugs in Public Housing, M2 PRESSWIRE, June 9, 1997, available in
LEXIS, News Database, Wire Service Stories. ("[I]t intensifies law enforcement activi-
ties in the 'worst of the worst'-the 13 cities with some of the most troubled public
housing authorities in American today."). Some public officials, however, would ar-
gue that this reputation is undeserved. See Safety and Security in Public Housing, supra
note 45, at 2 (statement of Chairman Gonzalez) ("One of the things that has become
identified with [public housing] is this undeserved reputation of being a center of
misbehavior and violence and the like. The overwhelming majority of public housing
developments are not.").
"' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1998).
4 See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., THE STATE Or THE CITIES 1998 at 35-36
(1998) [hereinafter STATE OFTHE CITIE] ("Although crime is mainly a local and State
responsibility, the last 5 years show that the Federal Government can play an impor-
tant role in reducing crime."). Virtually all of President Clinton's anti-crime initia-
tives only offer fiscal support to local crime prevention efforts. See id. at 36. For
example, the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and Community Prose-
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needed funding for maintenance and development." This rela-
tionship empowers HUD to direct PHA policy by tying funding
to HUD-approved anti-crime programs.5 '
Currently, HUD supports five strategies for reducing crime
and drugs in public housing. 2 Two of these programs, the Pri-
ority City Initiative and the Priority City Prevention Initiative,
bring together local and federal law enforcement officials and
the directors of the nation's most troubled PHAs to create inno-
vative law enforcement and crime prevention strategies.53 Two
other grant programs, the Housing Drug Elimination Program
and Operation Safe Home, involve public housing residents in
combating crime and drugs. 4 The Housing Drug Elimination
Program offers grants to PHAs that are used to fund local ten-
ant anti-crime patrols, community drug prevention, interven-
tion and treatment programs, tenant job training for security
guard work, as well as increased law enforcement, security, and
physical safety improvements that enhance security.5 5 Similarly,
cutors Initiative provide grants to hire more police officers and encourage prosecuto-
rial innovation within existing local agencies, respectively. See id.
o See U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEy., "ONE STRIKE AND YOU'RE OUT": POUCY IN
PUBLIC HOUSING 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter ONE STRUE]. This HUD-issued guide advises
individual PHAs on the one-strike policy in general, as well as HUD's evaluation-
based incentive program to encourage implementation. Id. "Under such a perform-
ance evaluation system, a high-scoring, high-performing PHA would receive less fed-
eral oversight and may be eligible to receive additional formula funds ... ; a PHA
with a failing PHMAP score would be ineligible for such additional funding and
could ultimately face a HUD takeover of its management." Id. at 4.
", See generally STATE OF THE CITIES, supra note 49, at 36 (naming HUD programs
that provide funding to PHAs). "HUD empowers public housing authorities (PHAs)
and their local partners with tools to target crime and drugs in public housing." Id.
52 See The White House, supra note 47. ("Vice President Gore today joined Attor-
ney General Janet Reno and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew
Cuomo in announcing a new four-part strategy to protect public housing residents
from the scourge of crime and drugs."). The fifth strategy, one-strike housing evic-
tions, was not mentioned in this White House press release.
53 See id.
"' See STATE OF THE CITIES, supra note 49, at 36. Resident involvement in, and even
management of, their public housing developments is quite common, and is dis-
cussed at length infta Part VI.
" U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., Cuomo Awards $5,826,420mn to Fight Drugs
and Crime in Public and Assisted Housing in Connecticut, M2 PRESSWIRE, Oct. 28, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Database, Wire Service Stories. See also The White House,
supra note 44 (providing a percentage breakdown for what types of programs are
funded by Drug Elimination Grants).
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Operation Safe Home "targets the collective resources of fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement agencies, public housing
staff, and residents to stamp out the worst infestations of gangs,
drugs, and violent crime in public housing developments and
the surrounding neighborhoods."56 Safe Home provides dollars
for local strategies that combine tenant vigilance and informa-
tion with aggressive law enforcement tactics that result in raids,
arrests, and convictions.
The fifth program is easily distinguished from the other
four in that its implementation involves neither law enforce-
ment nor public housing tenants. The fifth program has been
dubbed by President Clinton "One Strike and You're Out.
58
B. "ONE STRIKE, YOU'RE OUT"-THE TERMS OF A NATIONAL
POLICY
After first proposing the one-strike policy during his January
23, 1996 State of the Union Address, 9 President Clinton made
the policy official that following March by announcing: "This
policy today is a clear signal to drug dealers and to gangs: If you
break the law, you no longer have a home in public housing,
'one strike and you're out.' That should be the law everywhere
in America."60
In fact, the President's strongly worded challenge created
no new law. One housing authority director commented that
since the one-strike policy was announced, "We really haven't
changed anything. Itjust has a catchy little ring to it. '6 2 Prior to
'6 See Safe Communities, supra note 42.
57 See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEv., PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC HOUSING 36-37 (1996) [hereinafter PUBLIC
HOUSING THAT WORKS] (describing Operation Safe Home's cooperative efforts to tar-
get "the worst infestations of gangs, drugs, and violent crime in public housing devel-
opments and their surrounding neighborhoods").
' The White House, supra note 44.
'9 See Clinton, supra note 4, at *8.
6o Remarks Announcing the "One Strike and You're Out" Initiative in Public Hous-
ing, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 582, 583 (Mar. 28, 1996).
61 See Dzubow, supra note 29, at 56.
62 Laurel Walker, One-Strike-You're-Out Approach; Housing Authority Already Tough; Es-
sentially, Eviction Policy Already is in Effect in Waukesha, Director Says, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 1996, at Waukesha 2. See also McCormick, supra note 10, at South
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any mention of a one-strike policy, the Cranston-Gonzalez Na-
tional Affordable Housing Act of 1990 empowered PHAs to
evict tenants in response to criminal activity:
Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which-... (5) provide
that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing
tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other
person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of ten-
63
ancy.
HUD regulations give administrative force to this legislative
mandate.64
Consequently, most individual PHAs include similar lan-
guage in tenant leases.65 These lease provisions "make involve-
ment in drugs or serious criminal activity a basis for barring
people from moving into public housing and for eviction.
" 6
However, neither section 1437d(1) (5) nor its regulatory
counterpart require that PHA leases conform to the one-strike
mold.67 HUD does, however, encourage the one-strike policy's
Tampa 1 ("But Tampa Housing Authority Attorney Ricardo Gilmore explained the
new policy doesn't substantially change rules at the agency.").
42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (5) (1997).
24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f)(12)(i) (1997). See supra notes 6 & 21 and accompanying
text for regulatory language.
6' See Rucker v. Davis, No. C98-00781 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *3-*4
(N.D. Cal.June 19, 1998). For example, one lease states:
[T]enant, any member of the household, or another person under the tenant's control,
shall not engage in (i) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other public housing residents or threatens the
health and safety of the housing authority employees.., or (ii) Any drug-related criminal
activity on or near the premises ....
Id.
, The White House, supra note 44. It should be noted that the one-strike policy
includes empowering PHAs to exclude public housing applicants on the basis of prior
criminal activity. See ONE STRmE, supra note 50, at 5 ("The first essential element of a
One Strike policy is to ensure that those who engage in illegal drug use or other
criminal activities that endanger the well-being of residents are not allowed to live in
public housing."). See also PuBuc HoUSING THAT WoRKs, supra note 57, at 34-35.
("[S] tricter admission policies.., include comprehensive background checks on ap-
plicants, cooperation with courts and law enforcement agencies to gain access to
criminal records, and a fair and flexible tenant selection process that may involve
current public housing residents."). This Comment will focus on the one-strike pol-
icy's eviction prong.
67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d() (5) (1997). See also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (i) (1999);
Stephen G. Reed, Families Affected By "One Strike" Two Mothers Have Had Their Children
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application by using it as a criterion to evaluate individual
PHAs; enforcing the policy can lead to higher scores on PHA
performance evaluations, which might lead to less federal over-
sight and even additional funding.e HUD officials have com-
mented publicly that failing to implement the one-strike policy
will result in more strict federal agency supervision for a local
PHA.6 '
In addition to refraining from requiring one-strike lease
language, HUD also asserts that complicated cases involving in-
nocent evictions "will require discretion on the part of public
housing managers."70 HUD regulations make it clear, however,
that PHAs are not required to exercise discretion, but have the
option to do so:
In deciding to evict for criminal activity, the PHA shall have discretion to
consider all of the circumstances of the case, including the seriousness of
the offense, the extent of participation by family members, and the ef-
fects that the eviction would have on family members not involved in the
proscribed activity.71
Essentially, PHAs are given discretion to decide whether
they should exercise discretion when evaluating a one-strike
eviction.72 This option, however, is not available to courts that
Banned From the Complex Due to Drug-Related Offenses, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 11,
1996, at lB ("The policy is not a strict requirement. Local housing authorities-
which oversee subsidized apartment complexes nationwide-decide whether to imple-
ment the policy.").
See Mock, supra note 18, at 1503. See also ONE STRUM, supra note 50, at 3-4.
9 See Reed, supra note 67, at lB ("But those that don't [implement the policy] face
stricter [sic] supervision by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, ac-
cording to information from HUD.").
70 Office of Communications, The White House, Cisneros Briefing on Public Housing
Policy, Mar. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 139523. HUD Secretary Henry G. Cisneros
continued: "I have... been involved in sweeps of buildings where we found drugs in
a grandmother's apartment. And she said she didn't know anything about it, that her
grandson was responsible for it, and some discretion was applied in that case." Id. See
also Reed, supra note 67, at 1B ("'Housing authorities are given some flexibility to
handle eviction cases on an individual basis,' said a HUD statement. . .. 'In excep-
tional cases, alternatives may be considered, such as allowing a household to remain
in public housing if the offending member of the household moves and agrees not to
return."').
7 24 C.F.R § 966.4(o (5) (i) (1999).
n See Barajas v. Housing Auth. of the City of Harlingen, 882 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex.
App. 1994) ("Section 966.4(o0(5) (i) does not require that the Housing Authority con-
sider the circumstances of each and every case, nor does it require that the Housing
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review PHA evictions. One Pennsylvania court has held that a
judicial review that takes evicted tenants' extraordinary or miti-
gating circumstances into account amounts to an improper sub-
stitution of PHA discretionary authority.7s
The option to exercise case-by-case discretion may allow
public housing officials to soften the impact of the one-strike
rule. Applying discretion does not, however, provide any legal
justification for the policy itself, and does not respond to any
constitutional, jurisprudential, or statutory interpretive chal-
lenges to innocent evictions. An individual PHA decision to ex-
ercise its innocent eviction power selectively can promote
equitable resolutions in seemingly intractable situations;74 how-
ever, the eviction power itself still exists without restriction, no
matter how much the blow is softened in practice. 5 Therefore,
an analysis of the constitutional issues, lease terms, and attempts
at statutory interpretation are necessary to any comprehensive
evaluation of the one-strike policy and its approach to innocent
evictions.76
Authority consider all of the specified factors. [It] grants... discretion to decide whether
it wants to consider 1) the circumstances of a case and 2) the specified factors.") (em-
phasis added).
SeeAllegheny County Hous. Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1998) (holding that trial court's decision that one household member should not be
evicted for another's criminal activity was an improper judicial substitution of author-
ityjudgment and discretion).
7' See McCormick, supra note 10, at South Tampa 1 ("Gilmore said current leases
give the authority the option of taking a family situation into account.").
7 See Dzubow, supra note 29, at 59 ("However, if the PHA does not have authority
to evict the family, the fact that agencies choose not to evict families who lack knowl-
edge of a family member's criminal activity is not constitutionally adequate protec-
tion.").
76 See Robert Hornstein, Mean Things Happening In This Land: Defending Third Party
Criminal Activity Housing Evictions, 23 S.U. L. REv. 257, 260-64 (1996). Hornstein of-
fers a practitioner's guide for arguing third party criminal activity eviction cases, advis-
ing public interest lawyers to distinguish their client's case on the facts and make "a
defense from something other than whole cloth, from the facts." Id. at 271. Even
Hornstein felt compelled to review the constitutional and other legal issues involved,
id. at 260-64, although ultimately he recommends that actual litigants take a different
tack. Id. at 271-72.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ONE-STRIKE EVICTIONS
Not all constitutionally grounded challenges to the one-
strike policy focus on the eviction of tenants who claim to be in-
nocent. Tenant evictions triggered by criminal activity have
been challenged as violations of the Double Jeopardy,7 Exces-
sive Fines,7s and both the Substantive79 and Procedural Due Pro-
cess80 Clauses of the Constitution. In one such case, a New
Jersey District Court heard the plaintiffs claim that his eviction
from a Bayonne Housing Authority apartment following a con-
viction for possession of drug paraphernalia amounted to Dou-
ble Jeopardy,"' Excessive Fines, 2 and Substantive Due Process3
violations.84 First, the plaintiff claimed he was being punished
twice and fined excessively for the same criminal activity. A pre-
requisite and necessary element to both the Double Jeopardy
and Excessive Fines claims was a finding that the state action,
the eviction, was intended in part as punishment and not for
SeeTaylor v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314, 316 (D.N.J. 1995).
78 See id, at 316-17.
71 See Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
8 See Ruffin v. Kemp, No. 90-C2065, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10320, at *2-*3, (N.D.
Ill. July 7, 1992).
" U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. ("No person shall... be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."). According to the court in Taylor v. Cisneros,
"[t]he DoubleJeopardy Clause has been applied to the states via incorporation in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 321 n.12 (cit-
ing United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 131 n.12 (1980)).
812 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.").
8' U.S. CoNs. amend. XIV, § 1. ("[N] or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."). Federal courts apply a "rational
basis" standard to determine whether a non-suspect class's Substantive Due Process
rights have been abrogated. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,
152 (1938).
"4 See Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 316-17. Taylor was evicted under the NewJersey "Anti-
Eviction Act," NJ.SA 2A.18-61.1(n). Id. at 316. This statute grants the same eviction
powers as 42 U.S.C. § 1437d() (5), except that it requires good cause for private land-
lords to evict as well. Id. at 317. The statute preempts federal law. Id. Implicitly re-
ferring to this preemption power, Nelson Mock proposes that state legislatures adopt
statutory defenses that protect tenants by prohibiting innocent evictions, as has been
done in North Carolina. See Mock, supra note 18, at 1525. See also N.C. GEN STAT. §
42-64(a) (1998).
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remedial purposes. s The court held that the statute invoked
eviction powers "to protect tenants from drugs and other re-
lated criminal activity" and that "[e]victing an insidious tenant is
a rational and effective means of protecting all other tenants
from activity antithetical to their health, safety and welfare."86
The court found that the remedy went "no further than neces-
sary to effectuate the statute's purpose, ,87 and was not intended
to be punitive. It held that there was no second punishment in
violation of the Double Jeopardy clause, no excessive fine, and
no "punishment so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to violate
the due process clause. 88
Another line of cases feature litigants who have sought to at-
tack one-strike evictions on procedural due process grounds.
These cases challenge PHAs for failing to offer adequate pre-
eviction grievance hearings. 9 In 1990, the 1937 Housing Act9°
was amended to "allow elimination of pre-eviction administra-
tive procedures only in cases where certain types of criminal ac-
tivity is involved."9' HUD's regulations posit that such
administrative hearings are not required if the HUD Secretary
determines that the state where a PHA is located offers pre-
eviction court grievance procedures that satisfy a list of applica-
ble due process procedural requirements. 92 The Secretary em-
ploys a list of HUD-promulgated due process guidelines to
guide this determination.3  Since section 1437d(k)'s amend-
83 Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 319, 321, 323. The court relied on United States v. Halper,
490 U.S. 435 (1989), which formulated this "punishment vs. remedial" test. "State ac-
tion violates neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor the Excessive Fines Clause un-
less it constitutes punishment." Taylor, 913 F. Supp. at 319.
6Id at 321.
87 I at 322.
' Id. at 323.
89 See Wells v. Nelson, No. 91-3693, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 1200, at *1-*2, (6th Cir.
Jan. 28, 1992); Ruffin v. Kemp, No. 90-C2065, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10320, at *2-*3,
(N.D. Ill.July 7, 1992); Housing Auth. of the City ofJersey City v. Kemp, No. 90-1410,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19595, at *1-*2, (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1990).
o Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1997).
9' Ruffin, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10320, at *3. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) (1997).




ment, no challenges to the revised grievance procedure exemp-
tion have resulted in a published federal court decision.94
Constitutional challenges were also leveled against innocent
evictions long before the one-strike policy became a Clinton
Administration catch-phrase.5 One such decision, Tyson v. New
York City Housing Authority,96 held that evicting a tenant "solely
and exclusively because of the misdeeds of his adult child, who
does not reside in the parental home, 97 stated a claim for viola-
tion of a tenant's due process rights, namely the fundamental
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment." This First Amendment protection is applied to state ac-
tions via Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.9 The court also
found a valid Substantive Due Process claim, finding that
"[it] here must be some causal nexus between the imposition of
the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own conduct."1°°
By relying on a "causal nexus" test, Tyson creates a threshold
standard for evictee behavior in cases of non-resident, non-guest
criminal activity: that there must be a direct connection be-
tween the criminal activity cited and the tenant's own conduct
for an eviction to stick. Tyson, however, does not apply to the
other forms that innocent evictions may take, including eviction
9 Lexis search conducted October 20, 1998. Boolean search in FEDCTS library:
"1437d(k) and evictl" The 3 cases cited above, supra note 89, were based on evictions
for first party criminal activity evictions served prior to the 1990 amendment.
9' For a comprehensive review of civil liberties challenges to innocent evictions dat-
ing back to the 1970s, see Dzubow, supra note 29, at 58-61. From his analysis, Dzubow
concludes "[lilt is difficult to draw a general rule from the sparse case law available on
the subject of evicting families for the actions of one member of their household or
of a guest." Id- at 61.
369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
9' Id- at 516.
9' Id. at 518-20. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. L ("Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech.").
'9 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (holding
that Due Process Clause protects First Amendment freedom of speech); see also De-
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (holding that Due Process Clause protects First
Amendment freedom of assembly). No Supreme Court case has specifically incorpo-
rated the entire Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's State Due Process
Protections, nor has the First Amendment's right to freedom of association been spe-
cifically incorporated. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITrTIONAL LAw 772
(1988).
'* Tyson, 369 F. Supp. at 519.
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following a guest's criminal activity, or eviction of an entire fam-
ily for the crime of one member listed on the lease. More im-
portantly, Tyson also does not discuss the constitutional issues
implicated by evictions of tenants without knowledge of third
party criminal activity. Tyson does not decide whether knowl-
edge is required for an eviction to stand; it merely asserts that
something more than a familial relationship is necessary to
connect the tenant to the criminal actor.10'
One case, Turner v. Chicago Housing Authority, °2 did evaluate
the issue of tenant knowledge of third party criminal activity by
applying the Tyson causal nexus test to a Substantive Due Proc-
ess challenge.'0 3 The Turner court agreed with both the Housing
Authority and the evicted tenant plaintiffs that "to succeed on
their substantive due process claims, plaintiffs must show that
defendants' actions (1) deprived plaintiffs of their property (2)
for an irrational or invidious purpose.' '0 4 The court also found
that it would be an irrational deprivation "to evict one of the
plaintiffs based on the conduct of a third party when there is no
causal nexus between that plaintiff and the third party."'05 The
court declined, however, to hold that "unbeknownst-to-tenant"
guest criminal conduct demonstrated an insufficient nexus on
its face, and remanded the issue to trial for a finding of fact.0
°
The constitutional issues pertinent to tenant evictions are
not always adjudicated consistently. While some courts may find
that constitutional issues are fact sensitive,0 7 other courts may
refrain from making such inquiries entirely.08 Illinois state
courts, for example, have recognized that "a court should not
decide a case on constitutional grounds if it can be determined
on other grounds."' 9 Furthermore, an Illinois court held that a
101 Id.
2 760 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. 11. 1991).
.03 Id. at 1309.
104 Id
R0 Id. at 1309 (citing Tyson, 369 F. Supp. 518-19) (emphasis added).
'0 Id. The remanded state trial court decision is unpublished.
1 See, e.g., id.
' See, e.g., Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Rose, 560 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
" Id. (citing Lake Louise Improvement Ass'n v. Multimedia Cablevision of Oak
Lawn, Inc., 157 Ill. App. 3d 713, 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)).
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lease interpretation requiring some tenant knowledge of the
criminal activity rendered any due process causal nexus inquiry
unnecessary."' It is not uncommon, therefore, for constitu-
tional concerns to take a back seat to other plaintiff claims, as is
often the case when an issue of lease interpretation arises."'
IV. INNOCENT EVICTION LEASE INTERPRETATIONS
Many innocent eviction cases look primarily at the language
of the relevant lease clauses to divine the breadth of a housing
authority's eviction power."' This approach was common prior
to the 1990 codification of U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (5), when the
scope of criminal activity eviction clauses (and their language)
was left purely to individual PHA preference."8 For example, in
Spence v. O'Brien,14 the court interpreted a lease clause that pro-
vided for termination of tenancy "in the event the tenant uses
the premises for immoral or illegal purposes." 5 The court held
that the provision warranted eviction following a guest's crimi-
nal activity only if the tenant was aware of and able to prevent a
guest's illegal conduct, regardless of the tenant's own personal
involvement.116 In Housing Authority of Decatur v. Brown,"7 the
Decatur Housing Authority issued a more exacting provision,
requiring that a tenant "refrain from illegal activity" and "con-
duct himself and cause other persons on the premises with his
consent to conduct themselves in a manner which would not
disturb his neighbors' peaceable enjoyment . .. and [which]
would be conducive to maintaining the project in a decent, safe
and sanitary condition.""" Even with this more strict provision,
the court in Brown held that neither "the bare occurrence of a
"2 I& at 1135.
"' See infra notes 112-30 and accompanying text.
122 Rose, 560 N.E.2d at 1136-37.
'" See Housing Auth. of Decatur v. Brown, 349 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); See
also Henry v. Wild Pines Apartments, 359 S.E.2d 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987); Spence v.
O'Brien, 446 N.E.2d 1070 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
"4 446 N.E.2d 1070 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983).
... iL at 1073 n.6.
,16 R at 1074.
"7 349 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
' I& at 502.
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violation of law alone,""9 nor the arrest of persons in the ten-
ant's apartment whose presence he did not consent to gave the
Authority good cause for eviction.2
The passage of the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable
Housing Act created a national policy for one-strike evictions,1
21
but did not require that lease clauses be uniform in scope or
language.2 2  As a result, a variety of approaches (and lease
phrases) are currently used. 23 For instance, the New York City
Housing Authority Termination of Tenancy Procedures do "not
permit termination of the tenancy where the [criminal] offend-
ers have removed from the household.' 24  Accordingly, one
court allowed a petitioning tenant to retain her tenancy, since
she had removed her crack-possessing adult children from the
premises.1u In Chicago Housing Authority v. Rose,'12 the Chicago
Housing Authority's lease provided that "permitting weapons
on the premises,' 27 was a lease violation, and grounds for evic-
tion. The court defined the common usage of the lease term
"permit" as "to consent to... allow, tolerate... [or] authorize,' 28
and held that its presence in the lease supported the trial
.,9 Id. at 503 (plaintiff tenant's guest was brought in on a misdemeanor arrest for
possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal consumption).
" Id- In addition, prior to the 1990 codification, state courts in both Georgia and
Hawaii held that a tenant must have knowledge of third party criminal activity for a
public housing eviction to stand. See Housing Auth. v. Brown, 349 S.E.2d 501, 503
(Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a tenant should not be evicted when he did not
know of or consent to the use of his apartment by others for criminal activity); see also
Williams v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285, 291-92 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that a tenant's awareness of the violent acts of her children was necessary for eviction,
but also that such awareness of and ability to prevent violent behavior of a household
member should be inferred where there is a history of violent acts).
12' 42 U.S.C § 1437d(1) (5) (1997).
" Id. See also supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (sectioon 1437d(1) (5) and
HUD policy allow individual PHAs discretionary application of one-strike evictions).
'2 See Rose, 560 N.E.2d at 1131; see also American Apartment Management Co. v.
Phillips, 653 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Cabrera v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
590 N.Y.S.2d 90 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Corchado v. Popolizio, 567 N.Y.S.2d 460 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991).
124 Cabrera, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 91 (citing Brown v. Popolizio, 166 A.D.2d 44, 56 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991)).
12I5 .
126 560 N.E.2d 1131.
'2 Id. at 1135.
"21 I& at 1136.
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court's instruction that "in order to find for the CHA, the jury
had to find that the defendant knew or should have known of
the presence of the guns in her apartment."12 Rose demon-
strates that when PHA leases use terms indicating awareness or
consent, a knowledge requirement is necessary to warrant an
eviction, at least in Illinois state court.30
V. KNOWLEDGE OR CONTROL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Many PHA leases fail to contain convenient "consent" lan-
guage; rather, they more closely adhere to their ambiguous
statutory and regulatory parentage.13 ' As a result, courts looking
to determine whether there is a knowledge prerequisite for ten-
ant eviction must look to section 1437d(1) (5) and section 966.4
to search for Congressional instruction on the matter. The
most recent judicial attempts to interpret these provisions em-
ploy the frequently evoked administrative law doctrine first ap-
plied by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,3 2 and conclude that Congress did not
address "the issue of the tenant's knowledge of or ability to con-
trol the wrong-doer's criminal behavior."' '  For example, the
decision recently handed down on a denial of a motion to dis-
miss in Rucker v. Davis3 4 posits that section 1437d(1) (5)'s phrase
"any guest or other person under the tenant's control,"35 refers
only to the potential identity of the third party criminal actor. 6
This clause only acknowledges that the criminal behavior of a
guest or person under a tenant's control may trigger eviction; it
"2 Id.
" See e.g., Minneapolis Public Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 578 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that housing authority lease language on eviction for criminal activity
resembles language of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (5) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (ii)).
122 467 U.S. 837 (1984). For a comprehensive look at the Chevron doctrine and its
prominence in administrative law, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
541-645 (1998).
"" See Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *18, (N.D. Cal. June 19,
1998).
"
4 Id. The trial itself is currently pending.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(I) (5) (1997).
"6Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *18.
1999] 345
ADAM P. HELLEGERS
does not speak to whether the statute requires the tenant to
have knowledge of that actor's behavior for an eviction to stand.' 7
Modern administrative law doctrine requires courts to rely
on Chevron'38 and its two-step approach to judicial review of
agency statutory interpretation:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the
end of the matter [and the clear interpretation of the statute is adopted]
.... [Second,] if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the spe-
cific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.'39
To give Chevron's first step force, a reviewing court may in-
validate an administrative regulation which conflicts with the
clear congressional intent of an authorizing statute.140 However,
the fact that a statute is silent on a precise issue (e.g., whether
knowledge is required for tenant eviction) does not in and of it-
self preclude any agency interpretation and subsequent regula-
tory promulgation from withstanding Chevron scrutiny."4 If,
under step two, the court finds an agency's interpretation of a
silent or ambiguous statute to be "permissible," the agency's
construction is given force.4
However, even when a court determines that the statutory
language is clear, it may still find some ambiguity if the lan-
guage's clear meaning does not conform to the strongly stated
congressional intent found in the Act's legislative history. For
example, in Charlotte Housing Authority v. Patterson1 43 the tenant
mother and her two daughters were evicted following the arrest
of her son, a fellow household member, on murder charges. 44
The plaintiff argued that section 1437d(1) (5) did not allow a
137 See id
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
I91d. at 842-43(emphasis added).
140 See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447-48 (1987).
. See Texas Mun. Power Agency v. EPA, 89 F.3d 858, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Al-
though courts have, on rare occasions, managed to divine some meaning from si-
lence, a silent statute cannot preclude its reasonable interpretation by the agency that
administers it.").
142 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
4 464 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. App. 1995).
14 See i&L at 70.
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public housing tenant to be evicted "when she was not person-
ally at fault for a breach of the lease by a member of her house-
hold.'4 5  The lease used language very similar to section
1437d(1) (5): "I also understand that if I, members of my
household, our guests or visitors, and other persons under our
control, engage in criminal activity... on or near CHA prop-
erty, the CHA may end my lease."4 The court observed that
while neither the lease nor its governing statute made any men-
tion of personal fault, it did state clearly that criminal activity
ends the entire tenancy, and does not just eject the criminally
active tenant.
147
The court continued, however, to contrast this seemingly
clear interpretive result with the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez Act's
legislative history."4 It first cited a Senate committee report de-
claring that "eviction would not be the appropriate course if the
tenant had no knowledge of the criminal activities of his/her
guests or had taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to
prevent the activity.', 49 The court then funneled the perceived
contradiction between statutory language and legislative history
through Supreme Court precedent:
[elven if the plain language of the statute appears to settle the question,
a Court still looks "to the legislative history to determine ... whether
there is clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the language
which would . . .question the strong presumption that Congress ex-
presses its intent through the language it chooses."
"' Id at 71. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for a description of house-
hold memberJonathan Givens' criminal activity.
"' Id. at 69-70. The lease contained other clauses listing specific examples of ten-
ant, guest, or persons under control of household member actions that constituted
criminal activity. IM. at 69.
17 I. at 72. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (5) (1997) ("[A]ny criminal activity... en-
gaged in by a public housing tenant, [or] any member of the tenant's household...
shall be cause for termination of tenancy.") (emphasis added).
" Id. at 71-72.
"9 Id. at 72 (citing S. Rep. No. 316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1990)). The report
continued: "The Committee assumes that if the tenant had no knowledge of the
criminal activity or took reasonable steps to prevent it, then good cause to evict the
innocent family members would no exit [sic]." Id.
'0 Id. at 556 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987)). The
importance of legislative history in reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation is by
no means a settled issue. Compare Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421 (more than 10
pages devoted to a discussion of the relevant statute's legislative history) with Wagner
1999] 347
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The Patterson court interpreted the statute based on a
"clearly expressed legislative intent that eviction is appropriate
only if the tenant is personally at fault for a breach of the
lease,""" choosing to rely more heavily on legislative history than
the agency's interpretation or the plain meaning of the stat-
ute.15"
The Rucker v. Davis decision, however, rejected both Patter-
son's take on the plain meaning of section 1437d(1) (5) and its
interpretation of the relevant legislative history, finding both to
be "either silent or ambiguous" on the issue of tenant knowl-
edge or control. 53 In Rucker v. Davis, two independent plaintiffs
consolidated their claims after each was evicted for the criminal
activity of members of their household of which neither had
knowledge.5 While Patterson acknowledged that certain Senate
reports expressed Congress' clear intent to protect tenants from
eviction in the absence of knowledge of or control over criminal
activity,'5 the Rucker court accepted the defendants' contrary ar-
gument that the senators making these comments "simply did
not prevail in their attempts to include language in the statute
which would have protected 'innocent' tenants."1 6 While the
Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (very little attention to legislative his-
tory employed in Chevron statutory analysis). See also LAWSON, supra note 132, at 580-
98. Of course, some members of the Supreme Court think that legislative history is
wholly irrelevant to any statutory interpretation. See, e.g., U.S. v. Estate of Romani,
523 U.S. 517, 534 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I have in the past been critical of
the Court's using the so-called legislative history of an enactment (hearings, commit-
tee reports, and floor debates) to determine its meaning ... Today, however, the
Court's fascination with the files of Congress (we must consult them, because they are
there) is carried to a new silly extreme.").
... Patterson, 464 S.E.2d at 72.
152 See id.
155 Rucker v. Davis, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *17-*18 (N.D. Cal. June 19,
1998).
"' See id- at *5-*6. Plaintiff Pearlie Rucker, her grandchildren and great-grand-
child were evicted after her mentally disabled daughter (who lived with her) was
caught possessing cocaine three blocks from their apartment, and her adult son, who
did not live in the apartment, was caught with cocaine in his possession eight blocks
away. Id. Plaintiff Herman Walker, a disabled 75-year-old, was evicted after his live-in
caregiver and his guests were found to have possessed cocaine in Walker's apartment,
without Walker's knowledge or awareness. Id.
,-' See Patterson, 464 S.E.2d at 72 (citing S. Rep. No. 316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
179(1990)). See also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *17.
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desire to protect innocent tenants was reflected in the statement,
the court failed to find evidence demonstrating that the state-
ment's intent could be found in the statute.
5 7
However, the court also rejected the defendants' two-
pronged contention that the Cranston-Gonzalez Act's legislative
history demonstrates Congress did intend to permit innocent
tenant lease termination, choosing instead to find that the his-
tory was inconclusive.158 First, the defendants had introduced a
now-expired emergency supplemental appropriations meas-
ure,' -59 which directed the HUD Secretary to issue waivers for
eviction administrative grievance procedures for household
members not involved in criminal activity.' 6° They argued that
this indicated that Congress thought innocent tenants (i.e.,
those not involved in criminal activity) could be evicted, and
were only deserving of additional procedural protection. 6' The
court rejected this argument by countering that even if Con-
gress had intended a knowledge or control requirement, addi-
tional grievance procedures could still have been necessary
"since the statute would permit terminating the leases of tenants
who knew of the activity but were not personally involved."' 62
Second, the court denied that floor debate language reflect-
ing Congressional concern over drug use in public housing by
people not on public housing leaseS163 "equate [d] with an inten-
tion to permit termination of the leases of 'innocent' tenants. ' 64
Finding the statute and the legislative history to be incon-
clusive, the court moved on to the second Chevron step-assess-
ing whether HUD's statutory interpretation was permissible.
16
Since no rule on tenant knowledge could be extracted from sec-
tion 1437d(1) (5), the court retreated to the more broad cover-
age found in another section of the same statute-section
157 See id
8 See id at *17-*19.
159 Pub. L. No. 101-45, § 404(a), 103 Stat. 97, 128-29 (1989).
'6o See Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *17.
16 See id. at *17.
162 Id. at *18.
"Id. at *17-*18 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. 33148 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)).
"' I at *18.
'. See id. at *19.
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1437d(1)(1)'s edict that "[e]ach public housing agency shall
utilize leases which-(1) do not contain unreasonable terms
and conditions."'1 To divine an objective approach through
which to apply this reasonableness standard, the court turned to
"[t]he only federal court which has addressed what constitutes
an 'unreasonable' lease term in a published opinion,"' 67 the
Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond Tenants Organization v.
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority. 8
In Richmond, the court interpreted section 1437d(1) (1) "to
require that lease terms be rationally related to a legitimate
housing purpose."' 69  It held that off-premises misdemeanor
marijuana or alcohol charges were not "reasonably related to a
housing problem"70 and found that a lease clause requiring ten-
ants to "refrain from the illegal use, sale, or distribution of
drugs and alcoholic beverages on or off the premises,' 7' or face
eviction, was unreasonable.
The Rucker court, meanwhile, declared that under Rich-
mond's reasonableness standard it could not on a motion to
dismiss find
as a matter of law that terminating the leases of "innocent" tenants is un-
reasonable. The Court simply cannot conclude-without any evidence
before it-that the statute is not overbroad by permitting evictions of
tenants who themselves had no knowledge and no reason to know of the
drug-related criminal activity of another, or of tenants who had no ability. 172
to control the alleged wrong-doer.
Determining that the lease term's reasonableness was a question
of fact properly decided at the trial level, the court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunc-
tion on eviction proceedings prior to trial' 73
'6 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/) (1) (1998).
6,7Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *19-*20.
' 751 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1990).
61 i at 1205.
170 Id at 1206 (emphasis added).
17 Id (emphasis added).
,72 Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *20-*21.
'7" See id at *40. The injunction was served onJune 19, 1998.
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VI. AMENDMENT PROPOSAL: TENANT DECISION OVERJUDICIAL
DISCRETION
A. THE CURRENT STANDARD'S DISCRETIONARY DANGER
As the Rucker v. Davis decision stands, the propriety of an
innocent eviction hinges on an individual court's factual inter-
pretation of an alarmingly broad standard: whether a lease term
is "reasonable."1 74  That Richmond defines the reasonableness
standard as whether the lease term "is reasonably related to a
housing problem"'7 5 does not reduce the breadth of a court's
discretion and potential for inconsistency.
That such a large policy controversy will be decided incon-
sistently seems even more likely when one considers how fact-
sensitive innocent eviction trials already are. 76 One commenta-
tor and public interest attorney with experience in trying one-
strike innocent eviction cases argues that the outcome of an in-
nocent eviction contest will often turn on the defense attorney's
development of the facts of the eviction and her client's life. 77
Moreover, the uncertainty of outcome inherent in any jury
trial 78 virtually guarantees that the legality of innocent evictions
in a particular jurisdiction will depend on a discretionary legal
standard, the facts of the particular situation, the effectiveness
of the trial attorneys, and jury discretion.'7 9
17, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/) (1) (1998).
171 Richmond, 751 F. Supp. at 1206.
'76 See Hornstein, supra note 76, at 270-76. Note also how fact sensitive the out-
come of litigated constitutional issues can be, supra note 106 and accompanying text.
'7 Id. at 268 ("You need to develop the facts to learn about your client and your
client's life. Otherwise, the local housing authority will be able to define who your
client is, and their definition will not be very flattering.").
'7' Hornstein strongly recommends opting for ajury trial, reasoning thatjurors are
more likely to be swayed by an evicted plaintiff's personal predicament. Id. at 271-72.
171 Id. For an example of when a reasonableness standard is applied inconsistently
on a case by case basis, see STEFANIE LIEBERMAN, RESOLVING CASES OF NAzi-LOOTED ART
49 (1999) (on file with author). When an original owner of a piece of stolen art
brings a suit for conversion against its current possessor, courts have determined that
the statute of limitations on that claim begins to accrue at the point when a reason-
able original owner should have known of the work's location. See O'Keeffe v. Sny-
der, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980). The point at which a reasonable original owner





While the multifaceted uncertainty of the reasonableness
standard can be used to the advantage of either party, 80 this
Comment proposes that this popular and legal controversy will
not be settled without a clear statutory mandate. To date, Con-
gress has not given section 1437d(1) (5) voice with respect to
whether knowledge or control is required in one-strike tenant
evictions. A statutory amendment to that provision of the stat-
ute could allow both public housing residents and HUD officials
to trade judicial uncertainty and inevitable litigation for tenant
empowerment. Elected tenant committees, drawn from the ranks of
public housing tenant and community organizations, should be empow-
ered to create a general rule determining the role offault and knowledge
of criminal activity in tenant evictions."'
The scope of the created rule would only have to conform
to the very general constitutional parameters established by
prior case law. 82 For example, the rule would be wise to stay
within the constitutional boundaries set by Tyson v. New York City
Housing Authority,8' where it was held that a tenant eviction
based solely on the criminal activity of an adult child who does
not reside with the tenant states a claim for a violation of sub-
stantive due process rights.'84 Similarly, Turner v. Chicago Hous-
ing Authority' held that that a tenant's substantive due process
rights require there to be a "causal nexus between that plaintiff
and the third party"186 for an eviction to be valid. The court in
Turner held that if a tenant is unaware of a guest's criminal con-
duct, a trial court may find that that nexus does not exist.1
87
case-by-case basis. SeeAutocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg
& Feldman Fine Arts, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990).
'go See id.
... The body's structure could be akin to that of a condominium or co-op board.
,82 See supra notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
369 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"' Id. at 518-20. See supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text for a more detailed
treatment of the Tyson decision.
760 F. Supp. 1299 (N.D. Ill. 1991).




While tenant boards would have to be mindful of these poten-
tial constitutional limits,"" any tenant-promulgated amendment
would pose no greater constitutional concern than the one-
strike rule does currently, where eviction power exists essentially
unfettered.'8 9
Moreover, any legal challenge to this localized rule would
be not only more difficult to make, but also less likely to prevail,
since public housing residents would promulgate the standard
themselves. Many innocent eviction challenges are based on
the notion that PHA officials are abusing their discretion by ap-
plying an unjust law.19°
2. Tenant Organization Structure
At HUD's own instigation, many tenant committees already
exist in structure and function nationwide.19' One of the more
prominent and powerful tenant organizations operates at the.
Chicago Housing Authority's Henry Homer Homes develop-
ment.' 2 At Homer, an eight member, tenant elected'93 Local
" One suggestion is for Congress to include in the amendment itself limits to the
tenant board's created rule that are mindful of Tyson and Turner-like boundaries.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d() (5) (1997).
' See Hornstein, supra note 76, at 273.
,9, See, e.g., U.S. "DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEv., COMMJNwr BuIuDING IN PUBUC
HOUSING: TIES THAT BIND PEOPLE AND THEIR COMMuNITIES 32-33 (1997) [hereinafter
Ties that Bind]. This policy guide for local public housing officials advises PHAs that
"[t]o begin to build community in public housing, a necessary step is to create a rep-
resentative community organization .... Public housing residents form the core of
this group.. . ." Id. Such tenant organizations are active in virtually every PHA. See,
e.g., Schroeder, supra note 9, at BI (interviewing Newport Housing Authority Resi-
dents Council board members on their views of the one-strike policy); see also
McCormick, supra note 10, at South Tampa 1 (interviewing the Robles Park Resident
Council President and other tenant leaders on the one-strike policy's fairness).
" See Maudlyne Ihejirika, Land Plans Fuel Contests; CHA Residents Elect Councils,
CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at 3 ("CHA residents vote today to elect some 900
representatives to 19 resident advisory councils."). Resident Local Advisory Councils
("LACs") have existed since 1971 and operate beneath an umbrella tenants' organiza-
tion, the Central Advisory Council ("CAC"). Patrick Reardon, CHA Councils Don't Aid
Tenants, Critics Contend, CHIcAGO TRIB., Oct. 4, 1987, at Cl. In the past, LAC's have
been criticized for being perceived as a "rubber stamp for the CHA's management
and a political arm of Mayor Harold Washington," according to a wide range of crit-
ics." Id.
" Telephone Interview with Sarah Ruffin, LAC board member and Homer
Homes resident (Feb. 18, 1999) [hereinafter Ruffin Interview]. Between tenant elec-
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Advisory Council (LAC) oversees and approves the Homer
Homes' complete redevelopment, a transition from a series of
high rise apartment buildings to a community of mixed income
dwellings. 4
According to LAC member Sarah Ruffin, the LAG regularly
decides complicated redevelopment and neighborhood plan-
ning issues by majority vote.9 5 In making these decisions, the
LAG often polls residents or listens to their views at open public
meetings, so that the LAC's actions will really be the residents'
decision. According to Ms. Ruffin, "LAG members will be totally
involved, but will let [residents] speak for themselves on [an] is-
sue."'196 For example, in February 1999, the LAC solicited resi-
dents' opinions on which Homer buildings should remain
standing, and which should be tom down and replaced with
newer structures. "So far, more want their buildings to come
down.' '197  In Ms. Ruffin's opinion, the LAC's administrative
structure would be capable of defining the scope of the one-
strike rule's reach through the same procedure.'98
tions, Homer LAC board member vacancies are filled by appointment by LAC Presi-
dent Mamie Bone.
"' The LAC makes many of these decisions in conjunction with the Homer Rede-
velopment Council ("HRC"), a body put in place as part of a court approved federal
consent decree that ensures that Homer's redevelopment is tenant-run. See Deborah
Nelson, CHA Wins OK To Replace High Rises, CHicAGO SuN-TiMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at 31
(reporting that a federal judge signed a consent decree allowing CHA to demolish
Homer Homes high rises, in exchange for tenant control over Homer Homes' rede-
velopment and relocation plans). According to Ms. Ruffin, HRC's creation was one
of the terms of the ensuing settlement between HUD and Homer residents. Appar-
ently, many LAC members also sit on HRC, and many redevelopment plans are de-
cided jointly.
19' See Ruffin Interview, supra note 193.
196 m
197 Id In addition, in January 1999, the LAC voted to rehabilitate one of the larger
Homer apartment buildings with one, two, and three bedroom units, to provide
housing for different-sized households.
"' To be sure, Ms. Ruffin did not think the LAC would be capable of handling one-
strike eviction cases individually. She felt that the decision to evict a mother for her
child's criminal actions, although proper, would be "very hard." Ms.Ruffin added
that she "wouldn't want that responsibility." Moreover, Ms. Ruffin felt that a board
member's personal or familial relationship with a potential evictee would make the
decision even more difficult. Ms. Ruffin did, however, think the LAC would be capa-
ble of making a one-time decision that would set the scope of the policy that CHA
would implement. See Ruffin Interview, supra note 193.
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C. CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AS A FEDERAL GOAL
This legislative reform of the one-strike knowledge re-
quirement would be consistent with the language that encour-
ages citizen participation and tenant consultation that can be
found in recent Congressional public housing legislation. For
example, section 107 of the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez National
Affordable Housing Act ("Citizen Participation") 1 9 requires
each PHA submitting a housing strategy to
hold one or more public hearings to receive views on housing needs...
provide citizens ... with reasonable access to records regarding any past
uses of assistance under this Act .... [A] participatingjurisdiction would
be required to give citizens and other interested parties reasonable no-
tice and opportunity to comment .... A participatingjurisdiction would
be required to consider the comments and views of citizens and other
interested parties when preparing a final housing strategy[.] 20
This general spirit advocating tenant involvement is pep-
pered throughout the 1990 Act and its committee reports.
A more recent statement of HUD public housing policy not
only incorporates notions of tenant participation, but values the
public housing residential community as a PHA's primary asset:
"[a]s traditional sources of revenue diminish, public housing
managers are re-examining a previously little-used resource: the
energy and efforts of residents of public housing themselves. 2 2
Not only does facilitating tenant involvement in public housing
community building enable PHA managers to tap into a re-
source of shared interests, 2t HUD argues, it improves the lives,
prospects, and opportunities for autonomy for residents them-
selves. 4 Moreover, HUD asserts, individual PHA programs and
" S. REP. No. 101-316, at 198-99 (1990).
SId.
See, e.g., Representative Brooks, Just Saying No Is Not Enough: HUD's Inadequate Re-
sponse to the Drug Crisis in Public Housing, H. . REP. No. 100-702, at 3 (1990) ("While
HUD General Counsel . .. stated that '[a]ny solution to the drug problem would
have to be desired, and developed, locally,' we believe that drug abuse is a national
problem that demands a national response as well as active local involvement.").
2 Ties that Bind, supra note 191, at 1.
211 Id. at 13 (noting that public housing managers should take advantage of resi-
dents' determination to combat crime and other neighborhood issues).
2Id. at 13. "Community building encourages residents to take on leadership and
responsibility rather than be passive recipients of services." Id. at 1. "Community
building works because it builds the capacity of residents to: Take charge of their own
1999]
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policies are more likely to be accepted and successful if resi-
dents are identifying their community's goals and designing
implementation strategies themselves."5
Empowering tenants to set the parameters of the one-strike
policy's reach fits logically into HUD's own rhetoric for advocat-
ing tenant involvement. Such reform enables individual PHAs
to take advantage of their residents' desire to prevent crime, fos-
ters a sense of independence and community involvement
among involved residents, and encourages residents to take
ownership of the one-strike rule, thus increasing acceptance,
compliance, and cooperative reporting of criminal activity.
While HUD policy and practice is replete with the language
of tenant participation, no previous legislation has mandated
that public housing residents play a controlling role in individ-
ual PHA operation, beyond the weak citizen participation clause
found in section 107 of the 1990 National Affordable Housing
Act.206 Members of Congress have, however, repeatedly affirmed
their belief in the efficacy of tenant management programs.207
To hold Congress to its rhetorical commitment, academics
and redevelopment advocates have called for the statutory rati-
fication of more meaningful consultation and decisionmaking
authority for public housing tenants. 208  For example, Marvin
Krislov argues "that meaningful tenant consultation must occur
before HUD approves the demolition or sale of public hous-
lives. Support each other's efforts to improve life for themselves and their children.
Participate constructively in the life of the community, thereby improving conditions
and prospects for all." Id. at 13.
2" Id. at 14 ("Through resident participation in setting goals and designing im-
plementation strategies, residents assume ownership of the process. They are then
more likely to participate in the programs that are developed and likely to experience
a greater percentage of success than with a top-down approach.").
2'6 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1998).
20' See, e.g., Wasteful Management of HUD Funds in Public Housing Tenant Programs:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations, 104th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Rep. Shays) ("Resident management can improve public
housing living conditions significantly and enhance the lives of public housing resi-
dents. During my visit to Chicago's Cabrini-Green public housing development, I saw
firsthand what trained, motivated resident leadership can do to reduce crime and to
stimulate economic development."). See also Senator Moseley-Braun, Techniques for
Revitalizing Severely Distressed Public Housing, S. REP. No. 103-160, at 18 (1993) ("I think
tenant management has shown itself to be successful where it's been tried ...
20 See generally Krislov, supra note 39.
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ing.''  He analyzes a 1983 amendment to the Housing Act of
1937 prohibiting HUD "from authorizing the demolition or sale
of any public housing unless the PHA's application 'has been
developed in consultation with tenants and tenant councils, if
any, who will be affected by the demolition or disposition.'
210
Krislov concludes that this statutory language should be
strengthened by developing detailed standards for meaningful
tenant consultation that would "fulfill congressional intent and
would serve important policy goals."1
Perhaps more ambitious than Krislov's call for a clarifica-
tion of congressional intent is Benjamin Quinones' contention
that urban "redevelopment must be planned and implemented
by the residents of the redevelopment area. 21 2 Quinones cites a
successful community-resident controlled redevelopment, led
by the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative in Boston,213 and
concludes that resident-controlled redevelopment eliminates
the negative external controlling influences of downtown urban
elites and allows a community to serve itself.21 4 When compared
to the scope of Quinones' proposal or the Homer LAC's deci-
sionmaking authority, merely authorizing a public housing ten-
ant committee to resolve one discreet policy issue seems
eminently achievable.
20 Id. at 1747.
21
0 I& at 1746 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b) (1) (Supp. IV 1986)).
211Id. at 1749.
212 Quinones, supra note 39, at 693.
213 Id. at 753-58. One book chronicles the creation and development of the Dudley
Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI), an organization that combined the efforts of
an inner-city Boston neighborhood's residents with other local organizations, agen-
cies, and developers to "create[] their own bottom up 'urban village' redevelopment
plan and buil[d] an unprecedented partnership with the city to implement it." PETER
MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE 4 (1994). The resident-majority DSNI
board implemented a complicated and comprehensive 13-point revitalization plan,
ranging from vacant land acquisition and redevelopment financing to local job train-
ing and neighborhood business development. Id. at 57, 109-10. The Dudley Street
area did not include any public housing developments.
2,4 Quinones, supra note 39, at 771-72. Ironically, many "downtown elites," includ-
ing Riley Foundation Board members and pro bono corporate lawyers, sat on the DSNI
board, and ensured that residents had the necessary financing and technical building




Moreover, it is important to stress that Homer's success is
not an isolated one. In fact, there are currently fourteen federal
housing projects across the country operated solely by tenant-
management organizations. 15 Three of these tenant-run hous-
ing developments have recently experienced trouble in the
form of accusations of corruption and mismanagement."
However, Bromley-Heath, the nation's first tenant-managed
public housing complex, recently settled its problems with the
Boston Housing Authority, and retained control of the 1,500
apartment complex it has managed exclusively for 25 years.2 17
In many PHAs, tenant management is not a pipe dream, but a
reality; requiring all PHAs to settle this controversy by empower-
ing residents in every authority might enable more PHAs to real-
ize HUD's resident management community building goals.
D. ABILITY TO BUILD A LOCAL CONSENSUS
Lastly, popular outcry over the one-strike policy has demon-
strated that while PHA tenant opinion varies on the issue of in-
nocent evictions, often a localized consensus is expressed at
PHA tenant meetings and in newspaper articles.1 8 For example,
while San Francisco public housing residents have turned up at
hearings en masse to protest one-strike evictions for third party
21' See T. Trent Gegax & Evan Thomas, A Poverty Pioneer's Woes, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 7,
1998, at 36.
216 See Pamela Ferdinand, Tenant-Run Housing Takes a Hit in Boston; Takeover, Drug
Probe Shake Model Project, THE WASHINGTON PoST, Nov. 24, 1998, at A3. In recent years,
tenant-run projects in Chicago (LeClaire Courts), St. Louis (Cochran Gardens), and
Boston (Bromley-Heath) have been taken over by their controlling housing authori-
ties amid allegations of neglect and financial mismanagement. No comparison has
been made between the incidence of tenant-run authority mismanagement and mis-
management among agency controlled PHAs.
217 SeeJudy Rakowsky, Bromley, CHA reach agreement; Tenants to regain control of project,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 30, 1999, at B1. ("Housing officials said they took over the de-
velopment because tenant managers were not evicting drug dealers, as required by
law.").
... See McCormick, supra note 10.
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criminal activity,219 public housing tenants in Memphis generally
220
support such measures.
Undoubtedly, determining the scope of the one-strike rule
involves difficult decisions, and an overwhelming resident con-
sensus cannot always be expected. Homer LAC board member
Sarah Ruffin,22 for example, feels that evictions for third party
criminal activity are fair if the tenant knows of her guest, fellow
household member, or son's actions. She acknowledges, how-
ever, that while many of her fellow Homer residents might
agree with her, many others might find this stance too harsh,
especially because they "love their children. '2 While Ruffin
tells all of her relatives not to visit her if they are going to deal
drugs "because I could be evicted," she recognizes that not all
residents would feel like they could separate themselves from
their children for any reason, especially if they are minors.223
Ruffin also applauds CHA's current discretionary practice of not
evicting an entire household for one member's criminal activity
if that member is taken off of the lease immediately.224 Even
though she worries about how resident opinion might differ on
what she considers a difficult decision, Ruffin sees room for
compromise, and is confident that the LAC and its resident
constituents could come to a resolution.s
219 See Bowman, supra note 3 ("More than 100 people attended the first hearing on
the proposed rules yesterday. Although some praised the lease, most residents ar-
gued that it violates their rights and must be changed.").
22 See Out the Door, supra note 11, at 10A ("The new policy is a serious but necessary
step .... Many public housing residents, weary of the drugs, gangs and guns that of-
ten make normal life impossible within the close confines of a development virtually
ruled by criminals, will welcome the new policy.").
2*'Telephone Interview with Sarah Ruffin, supra note 193.
2 id.
' Id. Making a distinction between minors and adults introduces a possible com-
promise position with regard to knowledge of a third party's criminal behavior.
2' Id. However, she also alleges that CHA usually fails to exercise their one-strike
authority. Ruffin says that CHA rarely evicts anyone for criminal activity; usually, even





In recommending that PHAs create and implement one-
strike policies, HUD officials have declared that resident par-
ticipation and approval is essential to the policy's acceptance
and effectiveness: "[t]o be truly effective, a One Strike policy
must reflect a genuine community compact among residents,
housing officials, local courts and law enforcement agencies to
build safe, strong and inspiring communities for families and
children.",26 To meet this rhetorical goal, opinionated residents
in many PHAs are given the opportunity to voice their concerns
227at open PHA meetings or as members of PHA boards with
tenant participants.228
These meetings do not determine policy, however. Rather,
they are intended to "get the word out about the policy, '22 and
do not affect implementation. One San Francisco reporter
noted that even though "[t]he lease is still being reviewed by a
committee set up by the Housing Authority that includes ten-
ants . . . agency officials have quietly begun to move forward
[with the one-strike policy].,,20 Whatever inclusive overtures are
made, the fact remains that PHAs reserve the authority to de-
termine the scope of their own eviction powers, regardless of
the residents' input.28 '
For tenant opinion to amount to more than empty ap-
peasement, section 1437d(1) (5) must be amended to give resi-
dents substantive decisionmaking authority. Such reform would
26 One Strike, supra note 50, at 3.
22 See McCormick, supra note 10, at South Tampa 1.
2 SeeBowman, supra note 1, atAll.
2' See Darlene McCormick, Meetings on 1-strike regulations postponed, THE TAMPA
TRIBUNE, Aug. 20, 1996, at South Tampa 1.
Bowman, supra note 1, at All.
2 An "include residents, but retain final control" approach is stated more explic-
itly in HUD materials advising PHAs to involve tenants in the one-strike screening
process. See One Strike, supra note 50, at 6:
Because they have a clear and immediate stake in the outcome of tenant selections,
current public housing residents sometimes are the toughest screeners of new admissions.
Some PHAs have successfully used resident screening advisory committees. These committees
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enable both Congress and HUD to live up to their stated objec-
tive to engage tenants in the management and development of
public housing communities. Moreover, a departure from the
existing statutory language would discourage a reviewing court
from employing the inherently discretionary reasonableness
standard it currently enjoys. The proposed amendment takes a
controversial policy decision away from the courts and places it
in the hands of public housing tenants, the very people who are
most directly affected by the one-strike policy.
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